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Abstract. Cyber risk assessment for insurability verification has been paid a lot of research interest as cyber insurance represents a new dynamic segment 
of market with considerable growth potential for insurers. As customer’s practices and processes consistently lead to the final overall result, customer's 
behaviour has to be described in detail. The aim of the present paper is to design an instrument (questionnaire) for customer’s cyber risk assessment in 
insurability verification. The method for building an instrument (questionnaire) is empirical research. Empirical research is based on use of empirical 
evidence. A questionnaire with 11 questions is proposed. 
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PROJEKTOWANIE INSTRUMENTÓW PRZEZNACZONYCH DO OCENY ZAGROŻENIA 
RYZYKA CYBERNETYCZNEGO W WERYFIKACJI UBEZPIECZALNOŚCI 
Streszczenie. Ocena ryzyka związana z bezpieczeństwem cybernetycznym jest przedmiotem dużego zainteresowania badawczego, ze względu na to, 
że bezpieczeństwo cybernetyczne stanowi nowy, dynamiczny segment rynku o znacznym potencjale wzrostu dla ubezpieczycieli. Ponieważ praktyki 
i procesy klienta w ciągły sposób wpływają na końcową ocenę, zachowanie klienta musi być szczegółowo opisane. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest 
opracowanie instrumentu (kwestionariusza) do oceny ryzyka cybernetycznego klienta w ramach weryfikacji ubezpieczenia. Metoda budowy instrumentu 
(kwestionariusz) to badania empiryczne. Badania empiryczne opierają się na wykorzystaniu dowodów empirycznych. Zaproponowano kwestionariusz 
składający się z 11 pytań. 
Słowa kluczowe: zarządzenie ryzykiem cybernetycznym, ubezpieczenie cybernetyczne, bezpieczeństwo informacji, ochrona danych 
Introduction 
Cyber risk assessment for insurability verification has been 
paid a lot of research interest as cyber insurance represents a new 
dynamic segment of market with considerable growth potential for 
insurers. Companies estimate a premium potential of at least 700 
million euros in Germany by the end of 2018. Many companies, 
especially small and medium-sized ones, continue to 
underestimate risks associated with using the Internet. In large 
companies, safety management is in general better trained in 
comparison to medium-sized companies. But further challenges 
for companies are regulatory challenges in the context of General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and requirements of the IT 
security law, among others for operators of critical infrastructures. 
The global network creates problems that have gained significance 
under the term cyber risks. Any company connected to the Internet 
is vulnerable. Attacks on Sony, Google, Amazon and German 
Bundestag show the dimensions. Thus, a number of approaches, 
methods, tools and instruments have been developed for 
organisation’s cyber risk assessment in insurability verification. 
However, as customer’s practices and processes in an organisation 
consistently lead to the final overall result, customer's behavior 
has to be described in detail. Assessment combines information 
security relevant standards such as ISO 27001, NIST, BSI 
Standard, Cobit, etc. and enables cyber security assessment. 
Cybersecurity is "the process of protecting information through 
prevention” [10]. Cyber events can have financial, operational, 
legal and reputational implications. Cyber incidents can have a 
significant impact on corporate capital. Costs may include forensic 
investigations, PR campaigns, legal fees and court fees, consumer 
credit monitoring, technology changes and comprehensive 
recovery measures [2]. Cybersecurity therefore needs to be 
integrated across the enterprise as part of corporate governance 
processes, information security, business continuity and third-
party risk management. Cybersecurity roles and processes referred 
to in the assessment may have separate roles within the security 
group (or outsourced) or may be part of broader roles in an 
organisation. As IT security experts point out that it has become 
impossible to prevent data breaches, each organisation is 
considered to be unique that demands on an individual approach. 
For these purposes, Cyber Risk Dialogue to identify jointly 
insurance-relevant customer risks was elaborated [1]. According 
to Cyber Risk Dialogue [1], a dialogue cannot represent a risk 
assessment and should also be conducted openly and serve as an 
exchange between clients and insurers. Cyber Risk Dialogue [1] is 
based on such an instrument as questionnaire.  
The aim of the present paper is to design an instrument 
(questionnaire) for customer’s cyber risk assessment in insu-
rability verification. The method, an instrument (questionnaire) for 
customer’s cyber risk assessment in insurability verification is 
built, is identified as empirical research. Empirical research 
employs the use of empirical evidence, namely gaining knowledge 
by means of direct and indirect observation or experience. 
1. Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire is structured according to such domains and 
maturity levels of the respective customer as Existing 
certifications, IT security Organisation (IT security and risk 
management), Awareness for information security, Use of external 
service providers and contract management, Protection of IT 
systems, Network protection, Detection of attacks, Data 
management and storage, Access and access protection, and 
Physical security.  
Each domain and maturity level have characteristics that 
are classified according to valuation factors. Statements are 
categorized to assess customer's situation and track common areas 
across all maturity levels. Components are groups of similar 
statements to facilitate or comprehensively organize the handling 
of assessment. Based on a total of 38 questions (according to 
[5–11]), the questionnaire could be filled in with the findings from 
the risk dialogue by the risk engineer. This questionnaire is 
assessed by the Cyber Risk Engineer. This assessment provides 
the insurer, and risk engineer, with a repeatable, reproducible and 
measurable process to inform underwriters of client's risks and to 
assist in verifying insurability of cyber security. Cybersecurity 
maturity level includes domains, valuation factors, components 
and individual implementations of measures across four levels 
of responsiveness to identify specific controls and practices. 
Each maturity level contains a descriptive characteristic or 
a characteristic. Each of the questions contains four different 
answer options, which correspond to the respective risk situation 
of customer. Risk Engineer determines which category client's 
current practices best suit. All statements in each domain and in all 
included levels must be answered and classified qualitatively to 
achieve a best possible maturity of this domain. Risk Engineer can 
determine a maturity level of customer in each area, but 
assessment is not intended to determine a general maturity level
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of cyber security only based on these 38 questions in an equally 
weighted form. On the one hand, domains which do not apply to 
the respective customer must be excluded, for example if 
outsourcing is not carried out. Questions or domains that are not 
applicable to the respective customer have no influence on the 
determination of specific insurance capability. 
In principle, an equivalent quantification of rating can be 
made from 38 questions. Questionnaire is logically staggered so 
that a rating can be made based on the respective maturity of 
answers (between 1 = weak maturity and 4 = strong maturity). 
This can be calculated using the arithmetic mean formula: 
  (1) 
If the minimum rating value (> 2.00) is reached, the company 
is generally insurable.  
However, Risk Engineers have incorporated an exception to 
this fundamental weighting in the risk assessment, since there are 
11 show stopper topics as shown in Table 1 within the questions 
or domains, which must be considered separately.  
Inherent risk profile and company’s maturity may change over 
time as threats, vulnerabilities and operating environments change. 
However, fundamental domains and maturity’s levels are a 
prerequisite for company's cybersecurity, categorized as a show 
stopper. 
2. Show stopper description 
The present part of the paper clarifies the choice of 11 
questions classified as show stoppers and requirements to their 
minimum degree of maturity per area: 
Does a security organization with defined roles 
and responsibilities exist? 
Table 1. Showstopper 
Showstopper / Questions 
Minimum rating 
value 
Does a security organization with defined roles and 
responsibilities exist? 
2 
Do employees succeed in raising awareness and training 
on information security and cyber-security? 
3 
Are there any specifications for the secure basic 
configuration (hardening) of IT systems? 
2 
Is malware protection implemented in your company? 2 
Are there any procedures for patch and vulnerability 
management? 
3 
Are backups regularly performed and tested? 3 
How are external accesses secured? 3 
Are data transfers over unsecured networks protected? 2 
Does the processing of information in the public cloud 
take place according to the requirements of your own 
information security?  
2 
Have password quality requirements been implemented? 2 
Have physical security zones been defined? 2 
 
Since customer must take a holistic approach to cyber 
security, identification of basic roles within a security organization 
is important. 
The entrepreneur is therefore responsible for the organization 
of IT security in his/her company, but s/he cannot manage the task 
alone: the development of an IT security organization is necessary 
[4]. Depending on the company’s size, there are distinctive 
characteristics to be considered. In a small company between 10 to 
20 employees, it is difficult to create jobs that deal exclusively 
with the topic of IT security. Medium-sized companies may have 
financial means and the need for one or two full-time IT security 
jobs. International corporations cannot do without an extensive IT 
security organization.  
In general, IT security must be exemplified. Management 
must make decisions, set precise targets and of course, set a good 
example for implementation. In addition, IT security must be 
carried to all company’s areas, and it must be made clear that 
every employee is part of the IT security organization. An IT 
security officer should be appointed, even if not required by law. 
This can be an own employee or an external service provider. For 
core tasks, suitable employees must be appointed and equipped 
with sufficient skills. This is the only way to enforce the 
guidelines. Responsible employee must be given a necessary 
freedom to perform his/her duties adequately. Separation of 
functions is essential. For example, IT administrator may not be 
responsible for creating IT security policies at the same time [6]. 
All employees and executives (including management) must be 
regularly informed of the importance of compliance with the 
guidelines (e.g. SOX 2002, COSO 1992). This can be done 
through training, but better through advanced training or even 
small IT security competitions. 
Do employees succeed in raising awareness 
and training on information security 
and cyber-security? 
Human beings continue to be the greatest vulnerability in IT 
and non-digital information security. Whether out of good faith, 
ignorance or bad faith - confidential company data quickly falls 
into the wrong hands or the network is infected [14]. For example, 
phishing mails are a widespread form of social engineering, 
detection of the fake website, USB sticks left lying on the 
company’s car park or in publicly accessible areas of the company 
[4], documents such as alleged salary list of the Executive Board 
or candidates for an upcoming wave of redundancies. There are 
many technical measures, but ultimately the user remains the 
weakest link in the chain.  
Probably every user has already found such an email in her 
inbox. They can be used to pretend that you have completed a 
transaction on eBay, Amazon or PayPal with errors. You should 
correct this by visiting the site. If users follow this call, they will 
come across a website that looks very similar to the original. 
There they are asked to enter passwords or TANs. If now actually 
functioning Account-data is revealed, the theft starts on the real 
account.  
Detection of the fake website is usually easy, indications are, 
for example, security certificates expired, faulty or not available at 
all. URL or domain of the website seem strange, like amazon. tv. 
There are spelling mistakes in the e-mail and on the website. Also, 
not to be despised are USB sticks that seem to have been left lying 
on the company car park or in publicly accessible areas of the 
company. If the curious finder connects such a stick to the 
computer, she will catch a sophisticated Malware or Ransomware 
and possibly infect a large part of the company network. Finally, 
tempting are the documents contained therein, such as the alleged 
salary list of the Executive Board or the candidates for an 
upcoming wave of redundancies. It is assumed that the state-
contracted malware Stuxnet also entered the Iranian atomic plant 
Natanz via USB stick. 
However, no matter how an attack takes place or how you 
assess the threat situation: it is important that companies take 
themselves out of liability as far as possible and if they have 
established a comprehensive training and awareness-raising 
program, claims for damages can be passed on directly to the 
perpetrator. Incidentally, this is also the only sensible method of 
protecting oneself against any form of social engineering. There 
are many technical measures to filter e-mails or control accessed 
websites, but ultimately the user remains the weakest link in the 
chain. It is therefore important that companies achieve the 
required maturity level in risk assessment. 
Are there any specifications for the secure basic 
configuration (hardening) of IT systems? 
All measures taken in individual cases can only be effective to 
a fraction of their effectiveness as long as systems or system 
components, on which they are based, and respective application 
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to be secured are not sufficiently robust and built on a system 
environment that is secured in principle [2, 8]. For example, 
it is not sufficient to protect a database against unauthorized 
access if the operating system allows "anonymous" access at any 
time. Customers need to know and secure concrete operating 
system architectures as well as the general system and basic 
services they use. 
Is malware protection implemented in your 
company? 
As malicious code is one of the most important tools used by 
attackers [12], customer must take appropriate countermeasures 
and reach the minimum maturity level.  
Because malicious code is one of the most important tools 
used by attackers, the customer must take appropriate 
countermeasures and reach the minimum maturity level. Every 
company should put together appropriate preventive measures 
against malware and regulate how it should be handled in the 
event of a malware infection. In addition to the classic computer 
viruses, malware also includes Trojan horses, computer worms 
and malicious software causing Ransomware. A security concept 
against malware should be developed as a basis for preventing the 
intrusion of malware into IT systems. Aware of the residual risk, 
measures must be taken to prevent the intrusion of malicious 
programs. If a preventive defense is not successful, the intrusion 
of malware should be detected as early as possible. The consistent 
application of the measures and constant updating of the technical 
methods used are essential. 
Are there any procedures for patch 
and vulnerability management?  
Since vulnerable software is a risk, a controlled process for 
patch management must be in place at customer's premises. Patch 
management is the process that evaluates, controls and installs 
software updates during operations. This ensures the functionality 
of used software components, eliminates security gaps and thus 
increases the stability of the production environment. 
Use of outdated software and resulting adverse effects on system 
security can have a negative impact on interruption of business-
critical infrastructures, data theft and data integrity, etc. 
In addition to hardware and software specifications, these include 
dependencies among each other. By means of a patch management 
process, company ensures the best possible security process and 
reduces risk. 
Are backups regularly performed and tested? 
Regular data backups must be performed to avoid data loss. 
In most computer systems, these can be largely automated. Rules 
must be set to determine which data is backed up by whom and 
when. All users should be informed about the rules for data 
backup to be able to point out any shortcomings (e. g. too little 
time interval for their needs) or to be able to make individual 
additions (e. g. mirroring important data on their own disk). 
Confidential data should be encrypted before the backup to ensure 
decryption even after a longer period.  
How are external accesses secured? 
Remote maintenance of IT systems involves security risks. 
In case of remote maintenance, a distinction must be made 
between internal and external maintenance personnel accessing 
the IT systems [1]. 
Are data transfers over unsecured networks 
protected? 
In the age of digitalization, data are constantly in motion. 
They are transferred from one point to the next via different 
devices. End-to-end encryption is an effective protection measure 
for communication via e-mail.  
Does the processing of information in the public 
cloud take place according to the requirements 
of your own information security? 
Various alternatives for cloud computing must be developed 
on a broad scale and subjected to a security analysis adapted to 
customer’s organization. Distinguishing features of the 
alternatives include, among other things, localities of the data 
centers, options for restricting the public cloud to specific regions, 
control options for the data flow and service levels offered [3, 7]. 
Contracts and service level agreements (SLAs) describe a 
complete and controllable service to guarantee quality and 
information security in the public cloud. It is also important to 
have own audit rights, key figures, migration and above all the 
regulations for terminating the contractual relationship.  
Have password quality requirements been 
implemented? 
Insecure passwords can be found quickly by crackers via 
simply trying them out (e. g. brute force attack, dictionary attack). 
The risk of becoming a victim of such an attack can be 
significantly reduced by users’ changing their passwords on a 
regular basis, paying attention to the security of passwords [6, 9, 
10, 11, 13]. A formal management process for the authentication 
information is required [7].  
Have physical security zones been defined? 
The Physical Security monitoring area deals with all aspects of 
secure organizational environment. The monitoring area is divided 
into two fields, namely Securing Areas, such as Entrance Areas 
and Rooms, and Securing the Equipment from Theft, Misuse, etc. 
Entrance controls ensure access to sensitive organizational areas. 
Technically based solutions are available in the form of terminals 
up to contactless detection. Earthquakes, tsunami, war or a fire can 
also have devastating effects. As a result, data and data media 
should be stored securely, the data center should be securely 
equipped, and all backup media should be stored at different (but 
also secured) location [1]. Equally important are various cable 
connections (power, fiber optic and copper cables for data 
transmission). The equipment required in a data center, such as air 
conditioning, emergency generators, UPS, ventilation, water 
supply, sewage, fire alarm system (incl. smoke detector, fire 
extinguisher and sprinkler system) and telecommunications must 
be checked and maintained [4]. Depending on the need for 
security, replacement systems should also be available. The most 
important protection against unauthorized persons is the 
sensitization of employees. To achieve the best level in the 
maturity model, the lifecycle model (Plan-Do-Check-Act) requires 
ongoing monitoring and maintenance. Insurability can already be 
reached (minimum 2) beforehand. 
3. Remarks and conclusion 
Instrument (questionnaire with 11 questions) has been 
designed. Depending on the customer's needs and wishes, Risk 
Engineer can formulate improvements for each domain or across 
domains. A gap analysis can be created between the current and 
the target maturity level. Customer can initiate improvements 
based on the identified gaps. Any organizational or technical 
weakness can necessitate many strategies and processes that have 
an enterprise-wide impact. For example, risk engineers’ feedback 
on individual domains that do not reach yet a required maturity 
can provide insight into new policies, processes, procedures and 
controls to improve risk management about a risk or the 
customer's overall cyber-security readiness. 
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Further work will focus on the one hand on the development 
potential of loss probabilities in selected industries. This includes 
possible data mining strategies on collected data breach 
information’s. On the other hand, future cyber insurance products 
will also have to focus more on the effects of the GDPR. For this 
reason, data privacy and information security requirements will 
also be addressed in the further work and the challenges will be 
worked out, as well as additional and necessary showstopper 
questions will be developed. 
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